Anonymous user authentication is an essential security mechanism for roaming services in global mobility networks (GLOMONET) 
Introduction
In a global mobility network (GLOMONET), a mobile user (MU) can access global services through its relationship with the nearest network access point [1] . If the MU wants to roam into a foreign network, mutual authentication between the MU and a foreign agent (FA) is required with the help of the MU's home agent (HA). Many anonymous authentication schemes have been proposed to preserve personal privacy during roaming access to the FA. Such schemes are based mainly on the two-factor authentication technology to enhance the level of security. Here the two-factor usually refers to the password and smart card of the MU [2, 3] .
The main security functions of the anonymous authentication scheme are mutual user authentication and session key establishment between the MU and the FA. As pointed out in [4] , a strong user authentication scheme should satisfy the following requirements: (1) user anonymity, (2) low communication costs and computational complexity, (3) single registration, (4) update session key periodically, (5) user friendly, (6) no password/verifier table, (7) update password securely and freely, (8) prevention of fraud, (9) prevention of replay attack, (10) security, and (11) the provision of an authentication scheme when the user is located in the home network (HN).
In 2004, Zhu and Ma [5] propose the first anonymous authentication scheme for wireless communications. However, Lee et al. [2] show that their scheme cannot achieve mutual authentication and perfect backward secrecy and that the scheme is vulnerable to the forgery attack and propose an enhanced scheme with minor modifications. Later, Wu et al. [3] and Chang et al. [6] independently find that Lee et al.'s scheme does not provide user anonymity under the forgery attack. Unfortunately, Youn et al. [7] show that both Wu et al. and Chang et al.'s schemes do not provide anonymity. In 2011, He et al. [4] demonstrate that Wu et al.'s scheme is vulnerable to several attacks and propose an improved scheme. However, Li and Lee [8] further show that He et al.'s scheme does not satisfy security properties such as user friendliness, fairness in key agreement, and user anonymity. In 2012, Mun et al. [9] analyze Wu et al.'s scheme, pointing out that their scheme also cannot achieve user anonymity, perfect forward secrecy, and the protection of the legal user's password, and then propose an enhanced authentication scheme. Nevertheless, Zhao et al. find that Mun et al.'s scheme is also vulnerable to both impersonation attack and insider attack.
Recently, some new anonymous authentication schemes have been proposed [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . This paper investigates these schemes based on security requirements for secure roaming services in GLOMONET and shows that most have several weaknesses. Unfortunately, the results show that Zhao et al.'s scheme [10] is vulnerable to a strong replay attack and is impractical in terms of the pre-distribution of system parameters. In addition, because their scheme includes useless encryption/decryption operations for open messages, it is inefficient in terms of computational complexity. To overcome these weaknesses and inefficiencies, this paper proposes an effective and secure anonymous authentication scheme designed to satisfy various security requirements and be suitable for low-power and resource-limited mobile devices by reducing computational costs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some mathematical preliminaries that are useful for a security analysis. Section 3 reviews Zhao et al.'s scheme. Section 4 shows this scheme's security weaknesses and points out its inefficiencies. Section 5 proposes a novel anonymous authentication scheme, and Sections 6 and 7 provide a security analysis of the proposed scheme and a performance comparison with existing schemes, respectively. Section 8 concludes.
Mathematical Preliminaries
This section discusses the one-way hash function and two computational problems: the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) and the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP), which are useful for analyzing the security of anonymous authentication schemes described in this paper.
One-way Hash Function
The one-way hash function h : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} l takes a message of any length as the input and produces a fixed-length output called as a hash value or message digest. A hash function has the following cryptographic properties [18] : (1) Pre-image resistance: Given a hash value y, it should be difficult to find any input message x such that y = h(x). This property is related to that of the one-way function. A hash function that lacks this property is vulnerable to the pre-image attack. (2) Second pre-image resistance: Given an input x 1 , it should be difficult to find another input x 2 such that x 1 ≠ x 2 and h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ). A hash function that lacks this property is vulnerable to a second pre-image attack. (3) Collision resistance: It should be difficult to find two different input messages x 1 and x 2 such that x 1 ≠ x 2 and h(x 1 ) = h(x 2 ). Such an input pair is called a hash collision. One of the most important cryptographic applications using the one-way hash function is the integrity verification of messages. In addition, the hash function can be applied to generate the message authentication code (MAC) or sign on the message to provide message authentication and non-repudiation services.
Discrete Logarithm Problem
Given elements g and y of the multiplicative group Z p * , the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) is the problem of finding a number x such that g x = y mod p. If p is assumed to be a large integer, then it is difficult to determine x given g, p, and y. The difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem is the basis for the security of several cryptographic systems such as the Diffie-Hellman key agreement [19] , the digital signature algorithm, and their elliptic curve cryptography analogs [20] .
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem
Given an element g and values of X = g x mod p and Y = g y mod p, the computational DiffieHellman problem (CDHP) is the problem of finding the value g x y mod p. It is difficult to find g xy mod p for given g, p, X, and Y if p is a large integer. For example, in the Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocol, even if an attacker eavesdrops X = g x mod p and Y = g y mod p during the exchange process, the attacker cannot compute the common key g xy mod p shared between two parties.
Review of Zhao et al.'s Scheme
This section reviews Zhao et al.'s anonymous authentication scheme [10] . This scheme consists of four phases: registration phase, authentication and session key establishment phase, update session key phase, and update password phase. This scheme contains the authentication and session key establishment phase when the MU is located in the HN. This paper briefly describes the registration and authentication and session key establishment phases of Zhao et al.'s scheme. Notations and computational operations for a simple description of schemes in this paper are listed in Table 1 .
Registration Phase
If the MU wants to be a legal client, then it must first register to its HA through the following steps ( Figure 1 details the registration phase):
Step R1: The MU chooses the identity ID MU and password PW MU and generates a random number N MU . The MU then sends ID MU and h(PW MU || N MU ) to the HA through a secure channel.
Step R2: After receiving the registration message from the MU, the HA computes Q Step R3: Upon receiving the smart card, the MU inputs the previously generated random number N MU into the smart card
Authentication and Session Key Establishment Phase
If the MU roams into foreign network, it must prove itself to the FA as a legal user and verify the identity of the FA. The authentication and session key establishment phase of Zhao et al.'s scheme is described through the following steps ( Figure 2 details this phase): Step A1: The MU inserts its smart card into the card reader and inputs its identity and password. Then the smart card computes H' = h(ID MU || h(PW MU ||N MU )) and checks whether it is equal to H. Next, the smart card generates a random number a and computes Step A3: Upon receiving the message from the FA, the HA computes a common key R BC = cB and decrypts W 2 by using this key. Then, it verifies the FA's signature V 2 to authenticate the FA by using the certificate Cert FA . Step A4: After receiving the response message from the HA, the FA computes a common key R BC = cB and decrypts W 3 by using this key. Then, it verifies the HA's signature V 3 to authenticate the HA by using the certificate Cert HA . After authenticating the HA and the MU, the FA computes the session key SK = h(bdA) and W 4 Step A5: The MU computes dB = G MU ⊕ R AC and decrypts D SK [W 4 ] by using the session key SK = h(adB). Then it computes W 1 ' = h(N||dB||A||D||ID FA ||ID HA ) and compares it with W 1 . If they are equal, then the FA and the HA are authenticated. Further, the MU confirms that the SK is the common session key shared with the FA. Finally, the MU computes Auth = h(W 1 ||adB) and sends it to the FA.
Step A6: When the FA receives the message Auth, it computes Auth' = h(W 1 ||bdA) and compares it with Auth. If they are equal, then the FA verifies that the SK is the common session key shared with the MU.
Weaknesses and Inefficiencies of Zhao et al.'s Scheme
This section shows that Zhao et al.'s anonymous authentication scheme has the following weaknesses and inefficiencies:
Weaknesses Against the Replay Attack
In Zhao et al.'s scheme, suppose an attacker may intercept the login request message {A, DID MU , C, V 1 , ID HA } and send it to the FA next time. The FA and the HA accept this replay message for anonymous authentication and ensure that the attacker is a legal user. As a result, the attacker receives the response message {G MU , W 4 } from the FA. Although the attacker cannot compute the session key shared with the FA because it lacks knowledge of the MU's random number a, it can impersonate the MU to access the FA. This re play attack obviously causes unnecessary communications and computational costs. Therefore, Zhao et al.'s scheme fails to protect against a strong replay attack.
In addition, it can be assumed that the attack can replay mass login messages to the FA at the same time. Then the FA and the HA should always process from Step A2 to Step A4 per the request message. They cannot detect the attacker's behavior among all access requests in this strong replay attack. Therefore, because the FA and the HA can exhaust their computational resources, the FA or HA in Zhao et al.'s scheme can become a victim by the denial of service (DoS) attack. Because the distributed DoS (DDoS) attack causes the FA or HA to sit down, this replay-based DoS attack can become an important threat in Zhao et al.'s scheme.
Pre-distribution of System Parameters
The cryptographic primitive such as the hash function or encryption does not need any extra system parameters. However, in the primitive such as the Diffie-Hellman key agreement or digital signature, which is based on public key cryptography, system parameters should be handed over to the other entity through the pre-distribution or transmission during the communication session. All entities in Zhao et al.'s scheme uses the scalar point P and elliptic curve system parameters such as the field prime and coefficients of the curve equation. However, no entity transmits these system parameters in all transactions. This means that a trusted third party at the top level is required to provide these system parameters. This party should generate these system parameters once and previously distribute them to all HAs and FAs. It is extremely inconvenient when a new FA or HA joins GLOMONET. Further, because all entities should compulsorily use the same system parameters, Zhao et al.'s scheme is rigid and impractical. Therefore, there is a need for a more flexible and diverse anonymous authentication scheme. Under the assumption that GLOMONET contains various HAs, it should at least consider that the HA may generate different system parameters with other HAs and store them in the smart card of its MU.
Inefficiencies from Unnecessary Encryptions
In Zhao et al.'s scheme, the FA has two encryptions for the message, and the HA has one. In addition, the MU, the FA, and the HA all have a decryption operation according to the encrypted message respectively. The encryption function is basically performed to provide message confidentiality. However, most messages used as an encryption input are transmitted through networks in their scheme. Further, the certificate of the FA or HA is generally open information.
For example, inputs of the encrypted output W 2 are A, B, Cert FA , V 1 , and DID MU. Unfortunately, these inputs are known to all entities, including malicious attackers. Therefore, the encryption of a known message is unnecessary with respect to the cryptographic service of confidentiality. Among input messages of an encryption, only the dA value is not revealed. Despite this fact, even if the dA value is opened, it does not matter to security. As a result, because there is no need to hide sending messages in Zhao et al.'s scheme, encryption and decryption operations that increase operational complexity are useless.
The Proposed Scheme
This section proposes a lightweight and robust anonymous authentication scheme for roaming services in GLOMONET. The design elements of this proposed scheme include computational efficiency and resistance to security threats. The HA chooses a multiplication group G and a generator g∈ G whose order is q. That is, q is the smallest positive integer satisfying g q mod p=1, where p and q are large primes. In addition, p is the modulus for operations in group G such as q|p−1. The HA first chooses a random secret number c(< q) and computes C = g c mod p. In addition, the HA has a private/public key pair S HA /P HA and the certificate Cert HA of its public key. The FA also has its private/public key pair and certificate.
Security Model in GLOMONET
To design a practical and secure anonymous authentication scheme, security functions of each entity are investigated. The MU subscribes to its HA as a client. In the registration step, the MU sends its identity and some related messages to the HA and receives a smart card including secret information and system parameters generated by the HA. Afterward, if the MU wants to access the foreign network by using the password and smart card, the HA anonymously authenticates the MU. The HA then informs the FA that the MU is a legal user. Here there is a need for a countermeasure to check replay messages. The use of a time stamp for filtering old messages is a potential solution.
Based on the public key infrastructure (PKI), the FA and the HA mutually authenticate by using certificates of their public key. In addition, the Diffie-Hellman key agreement technique is used to establish a session key between the MU and the FA and authenticate each other. The overall outline of the security model of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 3 . In this GLOMONET environment, there are various HAs and FAs, and the HA has its own system parameters. Therefore, the MU with system parameters of its HA must send them to the FA to access the foreign network.
The proposed scheme consists of five phases: (1) registration phase, (2) authentication and session key establishment phase, (3) password change phase, (4) update session key phase, and (5) authentication and session key establishment phase when the MU is located in its HN.
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Registration Phase
If the MU wants to register to its HA, it must submit necessary information through a secure channel. After verifying that the MU is legal, the HA issues a temper-resistant smart card to the MU. Figure 4 details the registration phase.
Step R1: A new MU chooses its identity ID MU and password PW MU . Then the MU submits its identity ID MU to its HA for registration over a secure channel.
Step R2: After receiving the identity ID MU from the MU, the HA computes R = h(y||ID HA ||ID MU ), where y is the HA's secret master key. Then the HA stores the information {R, ID HA , C, g, p} in a temper-resistant smart card and issues the smart card to the MU through a secure channel.
Step 
Authentication and Session Key Establishment Phase
If the MU roams into a foreign network, it must authenticate the FA and prove its legality to the FA with the help of its HA. Figure 5 details this phase. The authentication and session key establishment phase between the MU and the FA is described as follows:
Step A1: The MU inserts the smart card into the card reader and enters its identity ID MU and password PW MU . After reading N MU , the smart card computes I' = h(ID MU ||PW MU ||N MU ) and checks whether I = I' by using the stored value I. If the checking holds, then the MU is verified to be a legitimate user. Otherwise, this phase is terminated. The smart card then generates a random number a and computes A a mod p, K = C a mod p,
P = ID MU ⊕ h(K||T MU ), and Q = H ⊕ I ⊕ h(A||K).
Finally, the MU sends the necessary message {A, P, Q, g, p, ID HA , T MU } to the FA over a wireless channel. Here, to avoid the user tracking attack, the length of ID MU should be less than h(K||T MU ).
Step A2: After receiving the request message from the MU, the FA checks the time stamp T MU to determine whether it is within the expected time interval. If not, the access request is rejected immediately. Otherwise, the FA keeps the time stamp and the message pair for some time to check the replay attack. If the FA receives the same time stamp and message pairs during this time interval, it decides that the second message is a retransmitted one and discards it. Next, the FA generates a random number b and computes B = g b mod p. Then it makes a signature by using its private key S FA such that U = GSFA (A, B, P, Q, ID FA , T FA ) . Finally, the FA sends {A, B, P, Q, U, T MU , T FA , ID FA , Cert FA } to the HA.
Step A3: If the HA receives the message from the FA, it checks the time stamps T FA and T MU to determine whether they are within the expected time interval and keeps the time stamp and the message pair for some time to check the replay attack. Then the HA verifies the FA's signature U by using the certificate Cert FA Step A5: Upon receiving the message from the FA, the MU checks that the received D is equal to A. Then it verifies the message authentication code Y generated by the HA. Then the MU computes the session key SK = TR(B a mod p) and verifies a message authentication code W generated by the FA. If it is valid, then the shared session key SK = TR(B a = g ab mod p) is verified.
Password Change Phase
This phase occurs when the MU wants to change its password. There is no communication with a foreign network or its HA. The password change phase consists of the following steps:
Step P1: The MU inserts its smart card into the card reader and enters its identity ID MU and old password PW MU old .
The smart card computes I' = h(ID MU || PW MU
old || N MU ), and checks whether I=I' by using the stored value I. If it holds, then the MU is verified to be a legitimate user. Otherwise, this phase terminates immediately.
Update Session Key Phase
The MU and the FA must renew the session key to ensure strong security when the MU is always within the same foreign network. The following processes are used to update the session key in the i-th session:
Step U1: The MU selects a random number a i , computes A i = g a i mod p, and sends A i to the FA.
Step Step U3: The MU computes a new session key SK i = TR(B a i mod p) and H i ' = h(SK i ||SK i−1 ) and compares H i with H i '. If they are equal, then the MU verifies the session key. Otherwise, the MU aborts updating the session key.
Authentication and Session Key Establishment Phase between the MU and the HA
If the MU roams into its HN, it must directly authenticate the HA and prove its legality to the HA. Figure 6 provides a detailed description of this phase. The authentication and session key establishment phase when the MU is located in its HN is described as follows:
Step H1: The MU inserts the smart card into the card reader and enters its identity ID MU and password PW MU . After reading N MU , the smart card computes I' = h(ID MU ||PW MU ||N MU ) and checks whether I =I' by using the stored value I. If the checking holds, then the MU is verified to be a legitimate user. Otherwise, this phase is terminated. Step H3: Upon receiving the message from the HA, the MU checks whether the received D is equal to A. Then it verifies the message authentication code Y generated by the HA by using the session key SK = K. If it is valid, then the shared session key SK = TR(C a = g ac mod p) is verified. 
Security Analysis
This section analyzes the security of the proposed scheme according to security requirements for a secure GLOMONET environment and compares the scheme with existing schemes.
User Anonymity and Untraceability
In the proposed scheme, the identity of MU, ID MU , is submitted to the HA over a secure channel in the registration phase. Because only the HA knows the identity of the MU at that time, an attacker cannot obtain it. Assume that any attacker eavesdrops on the message {A, P, Q, g, p, IDHA, T MU } transmitted between the MU and the FA. However, the attacker cannot derive the real identity of the MU without knowing the common secret information K between the MU and the HA. In addition, because the transmitted messages A, P and Q are dynamically changed in each session, the attacker cannot trace the MU's moving history and current location. Therefore, the proposed scheme can provide user anonymity and untraceability for the MU.
Impersonation Attack
To impersonate as a legal MU, an attacker with some arbitrary ID MU must cheat the HA. In the proposed scheme, the HA authenticates the MU by comparing the value V = h(y||ID HA ||ID MU ) with Q ⊕ h(A||K). An attacker can arbitrary compute A and K by using its random number a before sending the request message to the FA. However, the attacker does not know the MU's password PW MU and thus cannot compute I = h(ID MU ||PW MU ||N MU ) and Q ⊕ h(A||K) = H ⊕ I. Therefore, an attacker without knowledge of the MU's password cannot cheat the HA by pretending to be as a legal user. The attacker cannot impersonate as an HA (resp. FA) because messages generated by the attacker without knowledge of the private key are detected by the mutual authentication process of the FA (resp. HA). As a result, the proposed scheme can prevent these impersonation attacks.
Replay Attack
The proposed scheme adopts the time stamp to prevent the replay attack. If an attacker sends the previous session messages {A, P, Q, g, p, ID HA Consequently, an attacker cannot modify the MU's time stamp without knowing the secret common information K and the identity of the MU. In addition, the time stamp of the FA, T FA , can be authenticated to the HA by using the FA's signature U. Therefore, the proposed scheme can prevent the replay attack by using the time stamp.
Perfect Forward Secrecy
Perfect forward secrecy means that even if an attacker compromises the previous session key between the MU and the FA, it cannot derive a new session key. In the proposed scheme, because the session key SK = g ab mod p is computed using one-time random numbers a and b in each session, an attacker cannot retrieve the session key from transmitted messages A = g a mod p and B = g b mod p based on the security of the DLP and the CDHP. Because two session keys are always generated independently, knowledge of the previous session key SK * =g a* b* mod p and transmitted messages does not help in deriving the current session key SK = g ab mod p and vice versa. Therefore, the proposed scheme can achieve perfect forward secrecy.
Off-line Password Guessing Attack
In the proposed scheme, even when the smart card has temper-resistant protection, it is assumed that the MU's smart card is stolen by an attacker. In addition, the attacker can obtain H, I, ID HA , C, g, p, and N MU from the MU's stolen smart card by using strong physical attacks. After guessing the MU's password, the attacker tries to verify that the guessed password is correct or find ID MU by using the aforementioned collected information. The attacker tries to compute h(ID MU || PW MU guessed || N MU ) and compare it with I. However, this is not possible because ID MU is kept only by the MU and the HA. In addition, simultaneous off-line guessing for both the password and identity of the MU is really a hard problem for the attacker. As a result, the proposed scheme is secure against the off-line password guessing attack.
Insider Attack
If an insider of the HA obtains the MU's password, it can try to impersonate as a legal MU to access the FA. In the registration and authentication phases, the HA knows only the identity of the MU, ID MU . However, the insider cannot derive or guess the MU's password without N MU . In addition, the MU can change the password PW MU and the random number N MU without the help of the HA in the password change phase. As a result, the proposed scheme can withstand the insider attack.
Stolen-Verifier Attack
The HA and the FA do not maintain any verifier tables and secret key databases. Therefore, the stolen-verifier attack does not apply to the proposed scheme.
Local Password Attack
In the authentication and key establishment phase, if the validity of the user's identity and password is not checked before accessing the FA, then an attacker with a stolen smart card can impersonate a legal user in all transactions. Based on this fact, the proposed scheme is designed to avoid any unauthorized use for mobile devices by verifying the local password. Table 2 compares the proposed scheme with some recently proposed schemes in terms of security properties and functionalities. The proposed scheme satisfies almost all security requirements of GLOMONET. 
Performance Analysis
This section compares the performance of the proposed scheme with that of some existing schemes. Here the analysis focuses on the computational cost of the authentication and key establishment phase because this phase is the main part of the anonymous authentication scheme. Table 3 provides the comparison results for the total computational cost. The time complexity of the following primitives is compared in this table: (1) modular exponentiation, (2) scalar multiplication, (3) signature generation, (4) signature verification, (5) symmetric encryption, (6) symmetric decryption, (7) asymmetric encryption, (8) asymmetric decryption, and (9) hash operations. As shown in Table 3 , in the proposed scheme, the MU requires three modular exponentiations and five hash operations. As an example of the parameter length for security complexity, a 1024-bit prime p and a 160-bit exponent a can be adopted. In addition, two of three modular exponentiations can be pre-computed before starting the real session. The FA requires two exponentiations to establish the session key, generates one signature, verifies one signature, and performs one hash operation. The HA requires one exponentiation to authenticate the MU, generates one signature, verifies one signature, and performs four hash operations. It is easy to see that the proposed scheme is more efficient than existing schemes.
The proposed scheme uses no encryption and decryption primitives. There is a need to consider that the main cryptographic services of these schemes are intrinsically anonymous authentication and session key establishment between the MU and the FA. Therefore, in this phase, the important security functions are user authentication and message integrity between entities. Confidentiality can be achieved after establishing a common session key. As a result, encryption and decryption processing can be avoided in the proposed phase. Therefore, the proposed scheme is designed using only modular exponentiation, signature generation, signature verification, and hash functions.
Indeed, for the key exchange between two entities in the proposed scheme, the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman protocol can be adopted instead of the DLP-based Diffie-Hellman protocol. However, in the elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman protocol, the HA generates elliptic curve domain parameters, the scalar point P, and its public key C = cP and stores them in the smart card of the MU. Then the MU must always send these parameters with other messages to the FA in the authentication and session key establishment phase.
